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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Michigan, and it has been described as "practically ideal."17 The first pro-
posal is revolutionary. It makes possible the situation which it is the pur-
pose of the hypothetical question to avoid, namely the giving of an opinion
without letting the jury know beforehand the facts upon which it is based.'3
But while at fault theoretically, this proposal will work out better than
the present hypothetical question, especially in those jurisdictions follow-
ing the general rule that the hypothetical question need not contain all the
facts bearing on the issue in the case. Under that rule the lawyer has more
opportunity for abuse than he has under the minority rule, but the first
proposal of the act will practically eliminate all abuse by the lawyer be-
cause the statement of the facts upon which the expert's opinion is based
is shifted to the expert himself. The expert is also relieved of the necessity
of giving opinions on cross examination in accordance with hypothetical
variations. Furthermore, he is given the opportunity to base his opinion
upon data which he thinks competent and relevant. While at first thought
this might appear to be objectionable, it should work out to advantage, 9
especially in insanity cases, in connection with which criticism of the hypo-
thetical question is most vigorous.2 0 Continued decisions like that in the
principal case emphasize the need of reform, if expert testimony is to be of
real assistance in the securing of proper decisions upon complex issues of
fact.
S. K.
INSURANCE-RELATIONSIIIP By AFrINITY AS CONSTITUTING INSURABLE IN-
TFRT-[Missouri].-The relationship of a son-in-law to the insured in an
industrial life insurance policy was recently held to constitute an insurable
interest in the father-in-law when coupled with the fact that the son-in-law
had provided his father-in-law a home, taken care of him and paid his
funeral expenses.,
While, apparently at common law, life insurance policies not supported
17. 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 454 (1935).
18. 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (16th ed. 1899) sec. 441.
19. 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 455 (1935).
20. Glueck, supra, note 9, pp. 29 et seq.
1. Chandler v. American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 S. W. (2d) 883
(Mo. App., 1936). Industrial insurance is distinguished from ordinary in-
surance in that the amounts are usually small and the premiums are paid
at weekly intervals instead of annually, semi-annually, or quarterly. For
definitions see Ark. Crawf. & Moses, Dig. Supp., 1927, sec. 6016e; L. R. A.
1916F 461. In Kentucky the requirement of insurable interest has been
held unnecessary in industrial insurance on the ground that the purpose
of such insurance is not to create a fund to provide for the future support
of the insured's family, but to provide for the proper care of the insured
in his last illness and a respectable burial. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Nelson, 170 Ky. 674, 186 S. W. 520, L. R. A. 1916F 457 (1916); contra,
Williams v. People's Life & Accident Ins. Co., 224 Mo. App. 1229, 35 S. W.
(2d) 922 (1931).
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by an insurable interest in the insured were valid and enforceable, 2 the
doctrine of insurable interest is now firmly embedded in American law.2
Where the policy is taken out by the insured himself for the benefit of an-
other, the beneficiary need not have an insurable interest in the insured.
4
But where the contract is between the insurance company and a third party,
the courts are insistent on his having such an interest.5 This fundamental
principle rests on two grounds: (1) the necessity that there be no possible
incentive to take the life of the insured in order to procure the insurance
money; 6 (2) the general policy against wagering contracts.7
In spite of their accord on the necessity of an insurable interest, the
courts disagree as to what constitutes such an interest s The most goner-
2. Vance, Isurance (2d ed. 1930) 147. The situation was changed by
the enactment of the statute of 14 Geo. III, ch. 48, which forbade the mak-
ing of such contracts and declared them void. Cf. Whitmore et al. v. Sup.
Lodge Knights & Ladies of Honor, 100 Mo. 36, 46, 13 S. W. 495 (1890),
where it is said that this statute was merely declaratory of the common
law.
3. Vance, op. cit., 148; 1 May, Insurance (3d ed. 1891) sec. 102; 1 Cooley,
Briefs on Insurance (2d. ed. 1927) 370. In New Jersey policies without
interest are still enforceable. Howard v. Commonwealth Beneficial Ass'n,
98 N. J. L. 267, 118 Atl. 449 (1922). To the effect that this is the only
state so holding see Comment, 32 Yale L. J. 296 (1922).
4. Vance, op. cit., 151-152 and cases cited therein. The theory is that
every man has an insurable interest in his own life. See Afro-American
Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 195 Ala. 147, 70 So. 119 (1915). Professor Vance
prefers the statement that in such cases the matter of insurable interest is
immaterial. Vance, ibid. It appears, however, that although the policy was
taken out by the insured, if the moving party was the beneficiary, who him-
self paid the premiums, the court will deny recovery. See Cisna v. Sheibley,
88 Ill. App. 385 (1899). The main rule has been changed in some states by
statute, where it is required that in policies issued by assessment insur-
ance companies the beneficiary must have an interest in the life of the
insured. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5751; Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stats. 1935, ch. 73,
sec. 310.
5. Vance, op. cit., 151; 1 Cooley, op. cit., 330.
6. For an analysis of these reasons see Patterson, Insurable Interest in
Life (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 381. Quaere whether the criminal processes are
not a sufficient deterrent to overcome this presumption. But see Patterson,
ibid., 1. c. 389. Should the presumption be indulged merely because scat-
tered cases of this kind have found their way into the courts? See New
York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 6 S. Ct. 877, 29 L. ed.
997 (1886).
7. For definitions of "wagering contracts" see Carhill v. Carbolic Smoke
Ball Co., 2 Q. B. 484, 490 (1892); Restatement, Contracts (1932) sec. 520.
Is the Law inconsistent in sanctioning gifts inter vivos and testamentary
disposition of property, and opposing "wager" insurance policies? See Pat-
terson, supra, note 6, 1. c. 386-387. A distinction should be made between
cases where the policy is taken out by a close relative, though not possessing
a pecuniary interest in the insured, and those cases where the beneficiary is
engaged in the business of wagering on life. See Cisna v. Sheibley, 88 Ill.
App. 385 (1899).
8. Brothers have an insurable interest in the lives of each other because
of relationship alone. Century Life Ins. Co. v. Custer, 178 Ark. 304, 10
S. W. (2d) 882, 61 A. L. R. 914 (1928). Close relationship (as between
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ally quoted test, laid down as dictum by Mr. Justice Field in the Supreme
Court case of Warnock v. Davis,9 is that there must be a reasonable ground,
founded on the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or
of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continu-
ance of the life of the insured.
The rule is firmly established that relationship by affinity alone is not
enough to support a policy of life insurance.' 0 While it is held that a wife
and husband have an insurable interest in each other,:" in cases involving
mothers-in-law, fathers-in-law, sons-in-law, sisters-in-law, etc., the courts
have applied the rule strictly, even in the face of facts negativing both a
gambling venture and the possibility of the murder of the insured. Thus
it has been held that where the father-in-law himself procured the policy,
naming his wife beneficiary, and on her death assigned it to two sons-in-
law, the heirs of the father-in-law prevailed over the sons-in-law. 12 Even
where the mother-in-law lived with her son-in-law and was dependent on
him for support, he was held to have no insurable interest in her life.13
The instant case is an example of the liberal tendency of the Missouri
courts in applying the doctrine of insurable interest in life.14 In a leading
case in this country the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a woman has
an insurable interest in her fiance. 15 And it has been decided in this state
that the filing of a divorce suit by the wife does not destroy the interest of
her husband. 16 But where a sister-in-law could show no reason outside a
mere gambling intention, the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that she had
no insurable interest in her brother-in-law.'7
father and adult son) is insufficient, but must be accompanied by a pecuniary
interest. Life Ins. Clearing Co. v. O'Neill, 106 Fed. 800, 45 C. C. A. 641, 54
L. R. A. 225 (C. C. A. 3, 1901).
9. 104 U. S. 775, 779, 26 L. ed. 924 (1881).
10. Vance, op. cit., 161; 1 Cooley, op. cit., 387.
11. The apparent exception to the rule in favor of the wife rests on her
legal right to support from her husband. The apparent exception in favor
of the husband rests on his common law right to the services of the wife
and, under the married women's acts, by which the wife is entitled to re-
tain her own earnings, his expectation of services. Vance, op cit., 162. The
right of the wife to insure her husband's life is recognized in some states
by statute. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5736; Ark. Crawf. & Moses, Dig. 1921, sec.
5579; Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stats. of 1931, ch. 73, sec. 342; Ok. Stats. of 1931,
sec. 10518. See also 3 Vernier, Ameiican Family Laws (1935) sec. 230.
12. Crismond's Adm'x. et al. v. Jones et al., 117 Va. 34, 83 S. E. 1045
(1915).
13. Stambaugh v. Blake, 15 Atl. 705 (Conn., 1888).
14. Chandler v. American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 96 S. W. (2d) 883
(1936). The question does not seem to have been presented to the Kansas
courts.
15. Chrisholm v. Nat. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 213, 14 Am. Rep. 414
(1873).
16. Bowers v. Missouri Mut. Ass'n, 333 Mo. 492, 62 S. W. (2d) 599
(1933), aff'g 52 S. W. (2d) 599 (1932). Apparently this is merely a recog-
nition of the general American rule that a policy valid at its inception is
valid always. Vance, op. cit., 149.
17. Williams v. People's Life & Accident Ins. Co., 35 S. W. (2d) 922
(1931).
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The Supreme Court of Oklahoma took a liberal view in holding a son-
in-law to have an insurable interest in his mother-in-law, who had lived
with him and looked after his home and children.18 In Illinois it is said
by way of dictum that a decree of divorce ordering the husband to pay his
divorced wife alimony gave her an insurable interest in his life.19 Where
a man named his wife or his heirs as beneficiary in his policy, but on the
wife's death changed the beneficiary to a married woman, later divorced,
with whom he went to live and who took care of him until his death, an
Illinois court held that she prevailed over his heirs. 20 In Arkansas it was
decided that though a son-in-law has no insurable interest in his father-in-
law, this defense can be asserted only by the insurer and not by a rein-
surer.21 It has been held in that state that a son-in-law had no insurable
interest in the life of his father-in-law from the mere fact that the father-
in-law lent the son-in-law money, was willing to lend him more and was
kindly disposed to him, but the real basis for the decision seems to be that
at the time the policy was taken out the father-in-law was 60 years old,
thus giving rise to a suspicion that the policy was taken out as a wager.22
S. J. B.
INSURANCE-ToTAL DISABILTY BENEFITS-CHRONIC INTOXICATION AS
SELF-INFLICTED INJURY-[Oklahoma].-Is a disability resulting from
chronic alcoholism the "result of a self-inflicted injury" within the meaning
of that term as used in a life insurance policy providing for disability bene-
fits? This question was recently answered in the negative by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court on the facts in the case of New York Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Riggins.'
In this case by the terms of a life insurance policy the premiums were
to be waived during the total disability of the insured. The policy also pro-
vided that the disability benefits were not to be available if the disability
of the insured resulted from a "self-inflicted injury." In an action on the
policy the insurance company disclaimed liability because of non-payment
of premiums. It contended that the disability benefits should not be al-
lowed on the ground that the disability was caused by the chronic alcohol-
ism of the insured which was due to his intentional drinking of intoxicating
liquor, and hence was a "self-inflicted injury" within the terms of the
policy.
In rejecting this contention the court pointed out that although the in-
sured intended to drink the liquor, "he did not in fact intend to bring about
18. Mut. Aid Union v. Stephens, 97 Old. 283, 223 Pac. 648 (1924).
19. Begley v. Miller, 137 Ill. App. 278 (1907). The insured himself pro-
cured the policy, thus eliminating the necessity of her having an insurable
interest in his life.
20. Johnson v. Van Epps, 14 Ill. App. 201, aff'd in 110 Ill. 551 (1883).
21. American Ins. Union v. Manes, 150 Ark. 315, 234 S. W. 496 (1921).
22. Home Mut. Ben. Ass'n v. Keller, 148 Ark. 361, 230 S. W. 10 (1921).
1. 61 P. (2d) 543 (Okla., 1936).
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